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REPORT DATE (DD-
With those words, Secretary of State George C. Marshall galvanized our nation behind a plan for the political and economic recovery of Western Europe, to include our former enemyGermany. What has come to be termed Peace Operations (POs), have, over the last halfcentury, evolved into the most complex, challenging and as we learned in Somalia in 1993, sometimes costly endeavors pursued under the mantle of national interests. As of January 2003, the UN has officially recorded 55 peace operations since 1948 and of these thirteen are currently ongoing.
2 They have become increasingly more complex and often demand solutions that do not fit the peace keeping model that had developed from the Marshall Plan and been applied to conflicts until the 1990's. Known as Chapter VI Operations, these type POs are executed under UN mandate in accordance with strict Rules of Engagement (ROE). They relied on consent from all parties to a conflict. "Chapter VI addresses peaceful means of establishing or maintaining peace through conciliation, mediation, adjudication and diplomacy." Operations under this chapter are now referred to as traditional or classic peacekeeping and are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of agreements and support diplomatic efforts to reach long-term political settlements.
3
In the 1990s, however, experiences from Somalia to Kosovo suggested that Chapter VI peacekeeping generally did not work in environments where consent by all parties was not guaranteed. "John Mackinlay was among the first to argue that the concepts and doctrine which defined classic peacekeeping were no longer adequate to cope with the demands on peacekeepers in the civil wars into which they were drawn in the 1990s." 4 Operations became largely Article VII, Peace Enforcement Operations. These operations, also called expanded peace keeping, are normally mandated by the UN in situations where extraordinary humanitarian suffering out-weighs the need for consent from parties to a conflict. Although still conducted under UN mandate, ROE is more relaxed and the forces conducting the operations are usually better equipped to conduct combat operations if required. Often one side or more to the conflict has not consented to peace accords so combat is more likely to occur. This demands more robust military force. To meet these demands, the UN often relies on regional alliances or coalitions like NATO to provide forces. Due to the complex nature of civil wars, an end state is often difficult to determine and achieve. 5 The Balkans, where we still have soldiers today is as an example of this type peace operation.
Nation-building held such a negative connotation that during the Bush vs Gore presidential debates, it "… became a no-go area in foreign policy, with both candidates swearing to stay out of that minefield." 6 When the facts of the Somalia intervention are reviewed, some of the criticism of the UN proves ill founded. 
NATION-BUILDING IN AFGHANISTAN -HISTORY MAKES IT HARD
Internecine conflict within failed or failing states often leads to the cessation of international peace-building efforts. Once the environment becomes hostile to the point NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs) fear for their own safety and that of the people they are helping, as demonstrated in Somalia, and even in Afghanistan during its civil war, they in particular, and the international community in general will lose interest and reduce or completely abandon efforts in the country concerned.
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Over a year after the Taliban's fall, reports of unrest and even attacks against U.S forces and the Karzai government cause concern.
A U.S. military spokesman from the Bagram air base told media Nov. 25 that U.S.military bases in Afghanistan came under attack twice over the weekend. The first attack came early Nov. 23, when a 107 mm rocket was fired at a U.S. facility near Khost, damaging two trucks. The second came later that day when unknown assailants fired nine white phosphorus rockets at a base near Lwara, sparking several fires. On Nov. 24, a U.S. Special Forces base near Gardez came under small-arms fire.
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Added to this is the potential resurgence of Taliban and al Qaeda influence:
Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar says his militia has joined al Qaeda and the Taliban in efforts to expel foreign troops from Afghanistan. Hekmatyar announced the alliance in a statement distributed Dec. 25 in Pakistan by his followers, the Sydney Morning Herald reports. European intelligence sources have said his group bought vehicles that could be used for attacks in Afghanistan. U.S. authorities say they consider him to be a threat, although the size of his force is not known.
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Finally, to make matters worse, is continued outside interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs. Assistance to Afghan factions from regional states poses problems for Karzai's government in controlling the country.
Continued violence in Afghanistan will chase out European peacekeepers and force the United States to abandon many of its efforts to influence the political process as it focuses on pursuing al Qaeda fighters. However, other nations will retain an active hand. Those include Turkey and Uzbekistan -which will continue to aid warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum in carving out a fiefdom in the Uzbek-dominated northwest -and Russia, which backs Tajik factions that dominate the interim government.
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These conditions are not new to Afghanistan or the region. It is a country with a long history of fractionalization and tribal warfare. Being caught in the power struggles between foreign powers has further complicated this history. The volatile mix of outside intervention and internal fighting has been a factor in the development of the country's character and culture.
Unlike some mountainous lands, such as Peru, Nepal, and Norway -even at times Switzerland, its closest European counterpart -it has never been Afghanistan's lot to exist benignly apart from the rest of the world. It has instead found itself at the hinge of imperial ambitions since the beginning of recorded history, from the world's first transcontinental superpower, the Persian Empire, to its latest, the United States. In between enduring or resisting invasions from every point of the compass…the Afghans have honed their martial skills by fighting among themselves, in terrain that facilitates divisions of power and resists the concept of centralized control.
Mr. Goodson emphasizes the importance of five "contextual features" that are necessary in order to understand the country's "collapse and problematic future." These features, or "centrifugal forces", are first, "deep and multifaceted cleavages along primarily ethnic and linguistic lines, but also by sectarian, tribal and racial divides." Second, is the simultaneous unification under Islam divided by "hundreds of variations on its practice." Third, is a tribal social system that places loyalty to local authority above that to central authority. Fourth, is the rugged land itself, which serves to isolate people from each other and from their government. Finally, is Afghanistan's own modern history that, as Mr. Goodson claims is important, "…for the process of state-building has also provided a framework within which current politics must occur." Afghanistan is also central to forming her recommendations. She states that, "Throughout modern history, the peoples of Afghanistan have melded with those of its neighboring states, in part because the country's principal ethnic groups were dispersed across national borders."
She focuses on the "risks of spillover from Afghanistan" to weak countries in the region such as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Pakistan and therefore concludes that a regional approach is the only way to achieve stability.
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Given this very unique history, and some views of its impact, Afghanistan poses many challenges to the international community in the attempt to rebuild its government and revitalize its economy. With the pre-disposition of its people away from central governmental authority, a distrust of foreign intervention born from centuries of outside meddling, along with a tremendous potential for regional expansion of the "infection" in Afghanistan to its neighbors and the "warlord" issue, it is easy to see that the transitional administration faces significant, fundamental and deeply rooted obstacles. UNAMA, led by Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi as the Special
Representative to the Secretary-General, is now into its second year of multinational, multidisciplinary operations. Mr. Brahimi, has determined the way ahead for assisting the Afghans rebuild their country and is orchestrating the international effort there.
STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT
Strategic measures of success, according to the Challenges Project, "…include the thorough assessment of a potential mission; the creation of a clear, credible and achievable mandate that matches the mission with the resources; selection of quality leaders to conduct the mission; and an adequate donor base." 27 For the purposes of this paper, I will discuss the first two areas and the last area. Without a personal history and a UN performance appraisal of Mr.
Brahimi, judging whether he is a quality leader or not would be purely subjective if not impossible. I also don't feel that the answer would be particularly important to the purpose of this paper. Leaders are important, but if the strategy is flawed even great leaders will often not make the difference. 30 The purpose of all these meetings was to forge a way ahead to reconciliation and reconstruction of Afghanistan. It became apparent to Mr. Brahimi, as stated below, that all these meetings and processes needed to be focused towards these goals through a common vision.
Of course, Afghanistan's neighbours alone cannot help the Afghans achieve national reconciliation and rebuild their country. Here, the international community at large will need to make a massive commitment, politically and financially, to the long-term stability of Afghanistan. It is therefore necessary to strengthen other mechanisms for multi-lateral cooperation and coordination on Afghanistan. At this juncture, serious consideration should be given to ways to better utilize a rich pool of skilled Afghans in the planning and implementation of rehabilitation and reconstruction projects.
With respect to Afghanistan, the United Nations has over the years convened several groups of interested countries, in addition to the Six Plus Two, such as the G-21, which is comprised of a broader group of interested countries, who also have either influence or interests, or both, or who have been directly or indirectly affected by the Afghan crisis, and who could either directly or indirectly help contribute to its resolution. I share the view of those of its members who believe that this group should be reactivated and reinvigorated, and we have suggested that it reconvene on Friday. The United Nations also participates in the Afghanistan Support Group, convened by donor countries, the Geneva Initiative, in support of peace efforts seeking to legitimate a transition through a Loya Jirga, and other initiatives. It is essential that all these groups --and any other groups that Member States may wish to form on their own --develop a common, constructive position with regard to Afghanistan's political future.
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Although this assessment indicates great effort and may even lead towards a common goal, it does not appear to match "how" assessments should be made as outlined in the Brahimi Report and explained in the Challenges Report. Both make it clear that the assessment be as thorough and specific as possible and not rely on best case planning or ad hoc execution (criticisms of past UN operations).
(a) The Panel recommends that, before the Security Council agrees to implement a ceasefire or peace agreement with a United Nations-led peacekeeping operation, the Council assure itself that the agreement meets threshold conditions, such as consistency with international human rights standards and practicability of specified tasks and timelines; (c) Security Council resolutions should meet the requirements of peacekeeping operations when they deploy into potentially dangerous situations, especially the need for a clear chain of command and unity of effort;… Moreover, the Panel believes that until the Secretary-General is able to obtain solid commitments from Member States for the forces that he or she does believe necessary to carry out an operation, it should not go forward at all. To deploy a partial force incapable of solidifying a fragile peace would first raise and then dash the hopes of a population engulfed in conflict or recovering from war, and damage the credibility of the United Nations as a whole 32 To assist the Security Council in its responsibility to assure certain requirements are met, assessment teams are to be dispatched by the Secretary-General to the region. These teams, headed by a "senior civilian" -the position Mr. Brahimi clearly holds -are to: …include military planners, logistical experts, civilian police, and humanitarian specialists…the composition will depend on the crisis. Their job is to conduct a thorough and complete assessment of the situation and, if a mission is warranted, develop a concept for the initial phase. Other critical aspects of their assessment include determining the level of consent of the parties, conducting a 'troop-to-task' analysis of the mission (to help identify an appropriate size of the force), assessing the humanitarian needs of displaced persons or refugees, and determining the ability of the host country's or neighboring countries' economic and industrial base to support a peacekeeping force. The challenge that faces us now is to speed up the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Afghans, to help chart a path that will lead to a stable and unified Afghanistan and rebuild a country shattered by over two decades of war. With this in mind I decided to ask Mr. Brahimi to serve as my Special Representative with overall responsibility for the political, humanitarian and reconstruction aspects of the United Nations efforts in Afghanistan. I am very encouraged by the international community's support for the intensified efforts of the United Nations in Afghanistan. Mr. Brahimi and his team will make every effort to help the Afghan parties to build bridges towards a brighter and sustainable future, with a broad-based and fully representative government that will be at peace internally and with its neighbours. The talks with representatives of the Afghan parties in Bonn that started on 27 November are a first step in this direction. As I have stated on several occasions during the past weeks, any solution to the Afghan crisis must be "home-grown". The international community cannot impose a settlement on the Afghan people. I am confident that the Afghan parties will reach an acceptable and legitimate settlement if they approach the difficult path ahead with a constructive spirit and a genuine willingness to compromise for the greater good and well-being of all people living in and returning to Afghanistan. The United Nations stands ready to assist the people of Afghanistan in these endeavours.
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It should also be noted that this occurs after the Bonn Agreement is signed by the Afghan representatives, and only then is it apparent that the effort is to be consolidated under Mr.
Brahimi. Actual requirements for resources, to include how large a peacekeeping force, were not even addressed in the Bonn Agreement itself, nor any specific assessments leading up to it.
For example, the size of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was not determined by the needs for security in the country, but by the limits imposed by UN member nations and Afghan participants to the Bonn Meeting themselves. 35 This directly violates the recommendation stated above that the mission not even go forward for Security Council resolution without sufficient force identified and promised by member states in the Brahimi
Report. The efforts in Afghanistan, clearly laid out in the Bonn Agreement, would be very broad, encompassing emergency humanitarian assistance and nation building functions like establishing legal institutions, police, and at least the rudimentary services governments provide such as school and road building. As would be determined later, after being on the ground in Kabul, the lack of sufficient security to meet the needs of a mandate of this scope will become an issue.
More importantly, the impetus on speeding up both humanitarian assistance and development of the way ahead to reconstruction, seems to have had precedence over thoroughness of the assessment. This need to accelerate the establishment of the interim administration was possibly due to the un-forecasted speed of U.S. military success in defeating the Taliban. The removal of that regime could leave a power vacuum into which the powerful warlords could step, unless Mr. Brahimi could get the interim administration into Kabul first.
That may well have been the case, but it is my contention, that this preoccupation with getting into Kabul quickly, will have strategic and operational consequences both in the actual agreement as well as the way it plays out on the ground in Afghanistan.
From 28 November to 5 December of 2001, representatives from Afghanistan met in Bonn,
Germany with assistance from the UN for the purpose of drafting up the initial agreement for starting the nation building process in Afghanistan. Those participants were described by Mr.
Brahimi as four "processes".
…the Northern Alliance, which is composed of several parties or organizations that have been united in facing or in fighting the Taliban. The Rome process has been built around the King. The Peshawar group is the result of a convention that has taken place in Peshawar a few weeks ago. And the Cyprus group is a group of people from both refugees inside Afghanistan and the diaspora who have also been trying to work on a solution.
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The meeting was hailed as a historic first where representatives of all major factions (processes) in or deposed from Afghanistan, not rulers or strong tribal chieftains -met and agreed to begin the process of building a nation. Bonn was reported by some to be very unlike Bosnia or Kosovo since the UN did not bring together warring parties to make peace. Instead At the same time, Pakistan has sought to protect its interests by fashioning a strong Pashtun-based component for a post-Taliban government. Pakistan is wary that a post-Taliban government dominated by the Northern Alliance, which is backed by India, would amount to Indian encirclement of Pakistan. To counter that perceived threat, Pakistan was instrumental in ensuring that Northern Alliance leader Rabbani would not be chairman of the interim government. Pakistan also succeeded in building a role for the former King in selecting a permanent government, although the former King's role appears to be limited.
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Even the U.S. had interests in the outcomes of the meeting. Specifically, we were lobbying heavily for Karzai to be selected as the Chairman of the Interim Administration.
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Still others felt that the representation at the Bonn meetings was not fairly distributed among the various factions. This was noted by one of the "lesser" participants in the meetings, Pir Gailani, head of the 'Peshawar Group, "…Bonn was not equitable. Most of the portfolios have remained with the Rabbani government's representatives, who stayed in power. But after the Loya Jirga, we hope that a better government will be formed that better reflects the people's will." 40 These doubts can be downplayed as normal to the give and take of compromise. It can even be argued that compromise itself -consensus among Afghans, can be seen optimistically as starting the process towards reconciliation and moving ahead with nation building. In an interview prior to the Bonn meetings, this would certainly appear to be Brahimi's view:
We have convinced them [the four Afghan Processes] that they should get together and form one single process. In accordance with the ideas which I have put in the document which I submitted to the Security Council, and again I stress that these were ideas that have been widely discussed by Afghans, we think that there is a real consensus amongst all Afghans that what you need is a large council, a small authority to run the country on a provisional basis that would end in a Loya Jirga to give legitimacy to the process, and start the process of preparing a new constitution that will be adopted by a second Loya Jurga. Now, because of the fast developing situation on the ground, what we are already suggesting, and indeed what participants also are, I think, telling us, is that let's try and go straight to the small authority that is going to run, that is going to Kabul and be the provisional authority -the provisional administration of Afghanistan. And then go to the other steps -the council, the Loya Jirga, etc 39 www.un.org/News/dh/ latest/afghan/brahimi20nov01.htm Under scrutiny, however, one must ask whether or not these issues might create some strategic flaws in the agreement itself, as well as the assistance plan that would follow. The fact that Afghans themselves insisted on many of the terms of the agreement in order to insure ownership of the problem was key to the process according to Brahimi. Resolution requires a considerable degree of participation from all parties to the conflict as well as the good offices of a neutral body that seeks to facilitate their transition from a state of conflict to a state of peace.
The conditions for such participation include a degree of enfranchisement, buying into the process, by those who seek redress of wrongs or the address of particular grievances formed the basis of the original conflict. Although resolution begins with the peacemaking process -and usually culminates with the pomp and circumstance of a treaty-signing ceremony -it is not complete until the parties fully commit to the process of peacefully resolving their disputes. 46 Breaking the Cycle, p. 18.
As will be demonstrated in the next section, buy-in by powerful Afghans was not then and is not yet achieved. The nature of Afghan politics and warlord culture continues to play havoc with the long-term goals of the newly formed Afghan administration and its UN assistant UNAMA.
CREDIBLE AND ACHIEVABLE MANDATE
As a political body, the Security Council focuses on consensus-building, even though it can take decisions with less than unanimity. But the compromises required to build consensus can be made at the expense of specificity, and the resulting ambiguity can have serious consequences in the field if the mandate is then subject to varying interpretation by different elements of a peace operation, or if local actors perceive a less than complete Council commitment to peace implementation that offers encouragement to spoilers. Ambiguity may also paper over differences that emerge later, under pressure of a crisis, to prevent urgent Council action. While it acknowledges the utility of political compromise in many cases, the Panel comes down in this case on the side of clarity, especially for operations that will deploy into dangerous circumstances. Rather than send an operation into danger with unclear instructions, the Panel urges that the Council refrain from mandating such a mission. Conscious that some time may be required for the new Afghan security and armed forces to be fully constituted and functioning, the participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan request the United Nations Security Council to consider authorizing the early deployment to Afghanistan of a United Nations mandated force. This force will assist in the maintenance of security for Kabul and its surrounding areas. Such a force could, as appropriate, be progressively expanded to other urban centres and other areas.
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The facts on the ground at that time clearly indicated that an ISAF should not only be considered but that it would be essential to the interim administration's survival and ability to execute its mandate. Even Mr. Brahimi noted in his 13 November address to the General Assembly, "The pervasive presence of non-Afghan armed and terrorist groups with no interest in a lasting peace will necessitate the introduction of a robust security force able to deter and, if necessary, defeat challenges to its authority. While the real key to the restoration of security lay in the creation of a national army and police force, Mr. Brahimi urged that the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), currently operating only in Kabul and which has been instrumental in stabilizing the capital, be expanded to other parts of the country. Such an expansion would have an "enormous" impact on security, and could be achieved with relatively few troops, at relatively little cost, and with little danger. This may have given a veil of de jure legitimacy to the government in the eyes of the international community, but it remains to be seen if UN backing has produced defacto legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghans themselves. 
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Although the ISAF is the only specifically requested task laid out in the Bonn Agreement.
that demands military forces, the UN went into these operations knowing from previous experience that establishment of an Afghan National Army and civilian police forces would certainly be required. These two tasks have proven extremely problematic in places like Yugoslavia and East Timor. Once again, the fact that these tasks are not laid out in the agreement endorsed by the Security Council, demonstrates more the old way of doing business than trying to apply more rigid standards according to the Brahimi Report. Similar to previous operations, through a stream of resolutions, the UN gradually maps out its plan, instead of identifying the important tasks up front when establishing the mission. For police training, it was not until June 2002 that the Security Council passed a resolution that stated the following:
Reiterates its strong support for the Transitional Authority in the full implementation of the Bonn Agreement, including the establishment of a Constitutional Commission, and in strengthening the central government, building a national army and police force, implementing demobilization/reintegration activities and improving the security situation throughout Afghanistan, combating illicit drug trafficking, ensuring respect for human rights, implementing judicial sector reform, establishing the basis for a sound economy and reconstructing productive capacity and infrastructure; 55 It was not until his most recent report to the General Assembly, that the Secretary-General could even illuminate real progress in lead nation efforts in training the Afghan police.
The German-led police training programme is proceeding well. A new group of 500-600 trainee officers have been recruited and their training will begin in March 2003. The United States is also prepared to supplement Germany's efforts with a programme to provide basic training for thousands of police officers over the coming months. The Interior Minister is working on a draft presidential decree that would set out the course of police reform, much as the 1 December decree did for the army. warlords, and what we've observed thus far that they will do all in their power to coerce the people into voting or not voting for the benefit of the warlords and not the people.
CONCLUSION:
The overall approach taken by the UN in Afghanistan with specific regard to planning the security requirements for the mission do not appear to be substantially improved over how the UN has always done business. Despite having over ten years of experience in complex peacekeeping operations and having the opportunity to benefit from the Brahimi Report's recommendations based off that experience, the results of my analysis indicate that the UN still plans and operates on a very ad hoc basis. The conditions for operational and tactical success in Afghanistan, based on the tenuous security strategy that is still established through a very political and convoluted process, do not seem to be likely. Given this analysis and a performance history that runs the gamut from utter failure in Somalia to equivocal successes like Bosnia and East Timor, this does not bode well for this organization's effectively planning and managing future POs.
The groundwork has been laid and the framework for building successful peace operations is available through judicious application of the recommendations made by the Panel on Peace Operations. The UN and the International Community as a whole must work harder to make the UN peace operations capabilities effective. Failure to do so will only serve to undermine what credibility the UN still retains and frustrate donor nations.
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